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Executive Summary
 
 
In the wake of the current confrontation between 
Russia and the West, will the nations of Europe 
govern their interactions by rules and principles, 
as the signatories of the Helsinki Final Act hoped, 
or by the conjuncture or clash of national interests, 
unmitigated by a code of behavior? If by rules and 
principles, will those reflect shared values? Or are 
the values once deemed universal shared, in fact, 
only by certain elites? If a clash of interests prevails, 
can Europe contain the ensuing struggle and make 
the competition a non-zero-sum game? Or will 
each nation in Europe be faced with a series of stark 
choices between conflict and concession, winning 
and losing? 
Europe – by which we mean here the OSCE area 
– faces a multitude of challenges, some, such as 
terrorism or climate change, have external origins; 
and some pertain to our living together on the 
European continent. Among the latter is the 
Ukraine crisis, which clearly shows that the Helsinki 
Consensus is being challenged – not because it has 
been disavowed, but because each side in the clash 
between Russia and the West claims that the other 
has broken it. Other challenges, such as the rapid 
growth of populist, nationalist and xenophobic forces 
in the face of the migration crisis, are symptoms of 
strain. Confrontations between sets of values are 
played out both within societies and between them. 
As a result, the institutional foundations of 
cooperative security in Europe and the rules and 
principles they represent are rapidly disappearing. 
Both Russia and the West are starting to prefer 
deterrence to cooperative security. This spirit is also 
beginning to pervade economic relations and inter-
societal interactions. Other countries increasingly 
see this confrontation as a threat to their own 
security. Attempts to restore a normative approach 
to international governance – rules and principles, 
whether based on shared values or not – would 
appear to require a significant lessening of current 
tensions first. 
This report, therefore, argues that interim rules of 
the road in the security, economic and social fields, 
based on current realities and currently shared 
interests, are needed to help reduce those tensions: 
a modus vivendi that allows the sides to retain their 
principled positions on the European order, and how 
they believe it is threatened; but that also allows for 
the mitigation and containment of existing conflicts. 
This will not produce as much stability as a norms-
based regime, and may result in less human security 
for individuals, but it can pave the way for serious 
discussions that can lead to a return to norms and 
principles as a guiding force for the European order. 
The ideas in this paper are based on fifteen national 
narratives produced by institutions affiliated with 
this Network and which will be published separately. 
The narratives show that though in several countries 
– e.g., Russia, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom – societies perceive the standoff in 
mutually exclusive terms, the populations of many 
other counties have views that diverge strongly from 
the “Western” or “Russian” narratives. The narratives 
identify numerous shared interests on which to 
base an interim modus vivendi: on global and 
strategic issues and transnational threats, on conflict 
resolution in Europe and the Middle East, and on 
economic issues. 
4Our narratives generally recognize the need for 
a program of urgent action aimed at resuming 
dialogue and seeking cooperation, structuring 
multiple lines of dialogue as a starting point for 
broader intergovernmental cooperation, and 
agreeing on some urgent measures without political 
conditions and linkages. In light of recent dangerous 
incidents involving military forces, these should 
include an agreement in the NATO-Russia Council 
on avoiding military incidents and accidents and 
engaging in further dialogue on military risk 
reduction. Measures should also include dialogues 
on economic and social matters and the beginning 
of what will probably be a protracted dialogue on re-
establishing a shared understanding of the principles 
of the Helsinki Decalogue. 
At the same time, the narratives recognize that 
progress on resolving the Ukraine crisis will be 
a major factor in permitting the success of these 
measures and that failure to resolve that crisis will 
render most of them – and especially the attempt 
to re-establish norms – problematic. The OSCE has 
contributed greatly with the Special Monitoring 
Mission, but urgently needs to develop further 
operational capacity to make a greater contribution 
to the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements. 
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Key Recommendations 
We recommend agreement on a Code of Conduct 
for Facilitating a Diplomatic Process including 
elements such as: 
•	 		lowering	the	level	of	confrontation	by	avoiding	
steps that raise tensions and taking agreed de-
escalatory measures; 
•	 		strengthening	communication	by	de-escalating	
rhetoric and discouraging hate speech, 
maintaining channels of communication at 
all levels, conducting a dual dialogue: both on 
issues where agreement is possible and on issues 
where no agreement can be expected soon; and 
encouraging academic and other exchanges to 
mitigate contradictory and mutually exclusive 
narratives; and 
•	 		taking	measures	to	re-establish	cooperation	
by avoiding conditionality on cooperation, 
working together on climate change, terrorism 
and other global or transnational issues, 
consulting with partners throughout the world 
to encourage their involvment, and publicizing 
the willingness of political leaders to cooperate. 
We recommend creating a more connected 
economic order by measures including: 
•	 		developing	a	package	of	economic	and	
environmental confidence-building measures 
to counter the tendency toward autarky that 
has been strengthened by the use of economic 
sanctions by all sides. 
We recommend working on re-establishing a shared 
normative order through initiatives including: 
•	 		analysis	of	historical	narratives	on	Western-
Russian relations, 
•	 		initiating	a	dialogue	on	norms	at	the	societal	
level, and 
•	 		utilizing	existing	networks	of	young	leaders	to	
help shape future interactions. 
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Introduction 
 
Europe1 is passing through a period of 
unprecedented challenges in terms of scope, 
complexity and speed. They are generated 
from within and from outside of Europe and 
challenge Europe’s cohesiveness, integrity and 
competitiveness. Its competitiveness is challenged by 
ongoing shifts in the global distribution of power in 
an increasingly polycentric world. Its cohesiveness 
is severely tested by mounting global challenges and 
transnational threats, including climate change and 
transnational terrorism and a decreasing political 
ability to absorb inflows of refugees and migrants.
Europe’s integrity is endangered by disputes over 
the European order and deepening institutional 
fragmentation, within both multinational 
groupings and individual societies. Societies are 
increasingly entrenching themselves behind fault 
lines, particularly those between Russia and the 
West.2 But fault lines are also emerging within the 
Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian communities. Societies 
are often tempted to shield themselves from 
perceived external challenges through nationalism, 
isolationism and protectionism instead of addressing 
them through cooperation and openness. The 
challenges Europe is facing now are unlikely to 
disappear any time soon. Rather they will shape 
Europe’s agenda for years to come.
1 When speaking of Europe, we mean the 57 OSCE participating States.
2 By “Western states”, we mean all states that are members of or are 
associated with the EU and/or NATO.
While acknowledging numerous other fault lines 
affecting the OSCE area, this report concentrates 
on the divisions between Russia and the West. The 
reason is that Russian-Western relations represent 
the backbone of European security. There will be no 
resolution for the open and protracted conflicts nor 
agreement on an inclusive European order without 
cooperation between Russia and the West. 
The purpose of this report is not to assign blame, 
but to understand where we are and why, and what 
needs to be done to manage those divisions. Based 
on its analysis, the report strongly advocates the 
resumption of a comprehensive dialogue between 
Russia and the West. While such a dialogue should 
be independent from the current crises, it is evident 
that it can only be productive to the degree that 
progress in crisis resolution is achieved, particularly 
regarding the Ukraine crisis. On the other hand, 
more dialogue will facilitate progress in crisis 
resolution. The argument that a business-as-usual 
approach to relations with Russia is unwarranted 
does not preclude extraordinary dialogue and fails to 
address the fact that the challenges we are facing are 
unprecedented and require extraordinary means.
Dialogue should lead to what the report calls 
pragmatic transactional cooperation, that is, 
cooperation starting from the current realities. In 
chapter 3, the report proposes a number of urgent 
steps to be carried out within the OSCE and beyond. 
In addition, it proposes a number of projects 
focused on the link between the societal and the 
governmental level, to be implemented by the OSCE 
Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions 
(cf. section 3.2).
8The report is the outcome of intensive exchange 
and discussions among representatives of sixteen 
institutes from all regions of the OSCE area that 
participate in the OSCE Network. Our joint 
research and the discussions were supported by two 
workshops held in Geneva and Moscow in May and 
October 2016.
Narratives for a Europe in Crisis
 
The role of narratives on the current crisis of European security is emphasized by a ‘competition of 
narratives’ within a European order shaken by ‘the return of geopolitics’ and ‘the resurgence of geo-
economics’ between Russia and the West (as organized politically within NATO and the European 
Union) with the participation of in-between actors. 
As a concept for analysis and policy, narrative may refer to material, institutional and ideational 
drivers of actorness. From the strategic point of view, narrative is a means used by policy makers 
to construct a shared meaning of the past, present and future of international politics in order to 
shape the behavior of domestic and international actors. Publics regularly internalize and rationalize 
the world in the form of narrative and media may exert a greater impact on public perceptions than 
government.
From the discursive point of view, narrative is an identity-driven and identity-reproducing process, 
whereby nations, leaders or people strive to connect their roles and destinies with internal and 
external developments. As a result, narrative tends to be a widely used and recognized story of the 
past.
Narrative and policy belong together and proceed in parallel. Narrative is used to validate or 
legitimate policy to domestic and international audiences and those messages may not necessarily 
be identical, but may be tailored to serve a function or purpose. The need for narrative within 
governments and societies is at its greatest when there is a change underway or expected in policy. 
As interpretations of developments in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region, narratives serve to 
rationalize and validate strategies and actions in a formative period of international security. 
Kari Möttölä, Finland between the Practice and the Idea: the Significance and Change of Narrative 
in the Post-Cold War Era. (Paper prepared for publication in the context of the OSCE Network Study 
Group: European Security – Addressing Challenges at the Societal Level, forthcoming 2017.)
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The report builds on 15 studies on national security 
policy narratives3 written by the members of the 
group. In analyzing the differences and shared 
views among Russia, Western countries and the 
countries that cannot be attributed to either “side”, 
it focuses more on the link between the interstate 
and the societal level and less on the purely 
intergovernmental politics that are usually the main 
object of comparable reports. Therefore, it deals 
only peripherally with issues such as arms control 
or violent conflicts, but focuses on aspects that are 
more directly felt by citizens. We have chosen this 
approach because the current conflicts and problems 
run much deeper than intergovernmental politics 
and have reached the societal level. Suspicion and 
estrangement between societies have again reached 
levels not seen since the end of the Cold War. As a 
consequence, it has become much more difficult to 
re-establish cooperative politics, because re-creating 
confidence at societal levels is more difficult than 
at inter-governmental levels, where things can be 
repaired quickly if there is political will.  
3 These include Austria, Belarus, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, 
Italy, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the USA. These reports will be 
published in a separate book in early 2017.
An important finding from the studies conducted is 
that the narratives we have identified do not exactly 
match the standard Russian and Western security 
narratives, which are almost mutually exclusive and 
lay blame for all evil on the other side. The debate 
over Russia reveals very different approaches. There 
are countries such as Austria, Italy and France 
where perceptions of closeness and even friendship 
with Russia are prominent. Switzerland, deeply 
anchored in the West, takes positions, but largely 
avoids blaming sides. And there are other countries, 
such as Georgia, the United Kingdom and Ukraine, 
where people feel fundamentally threatened by the 
Russian Federation. On the other hand, narratives 
underlying even official discourses in a number of 
countries allied with Russia, such as Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, reveal remarkable differences from the 
Russian mainstream narrative. What unites almost 
all narratives is the shared objective of pragmatic 
cooperation among Russia, the Western states and 
those countries that belong neither to Euro-Atlantic 
nor to Eurasian institutions.
10
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The Challenges Ahead
 
The challenges ahead are numerous, complex and 
difficult to address. The situation in the OSCE area 
is characterized by a number of major fragmentation 
lines as well as external challenges that can 
roughly be sorted into four groups: fragmentation 
and divisions within and between societies; 
fragmentation within the integration structures; 
conflicts in Russian-Western relations; and negative 
influences from outside. 
Divisions and Authoritarianism  
within Societies 
We start from the assumption that long-term and 
more fundamental political change is driven by 
societal forces. Under the heading of society we 
understand all strata of the population of a country 
apart from the sphere of institutionalized politics – 
ideally parliaments and governments. Thus, society 
includes a broad variety of associations of any 
kind from business networks and trade unions, via 
churches, sports clubs, and cultural and scientific 
associations to non-governmental organizations.
In most countries within the OSCE area, we observe 
a deepening of domestic fragmentation lines and 
the strengthening of populist, nationalist and 
xenophobic forces whose main desire is to cut their 
countries off from global developments. In some 
countries, these forces, by exploiting disconnects 
between ruling establishments and populations, 
have influenced the formation of governments or 
even assumed political power. Political forces of this 
kind represent a serious danger to a free and open 
Europe.
 
More people perceive threats and harbor suspicion 
and even hatred than at any time since the end of 
the Cold War. Because it is necessary for political 
leaders to secure the support of their electorates 
before they can repair ties at the intergovernmental 
level, any return to cooperative politics has become 
more difficult.  
Fragmentation within the Integration 
Structures 
The European Union (EU) is the most sophisticated 
integration structure in the OSCE space. Its 
development is key for the whole of Europe, and 
the EU-Russia relationship is a major pillar of the 
European order. 
Currently, the EU’s internal disagreements are 
so serious that they amount to a comprehensive 
crisis. No recipe has yet been found for the deep 
socioeconomic North-South divide within the EU. 
With Brexit, the EU will lose one of its strongest 
member states. A substantial move backwards 
towards disintegration can no longer be ruled out. 
Such a development would harm the whole of 
Europe and can be in nobody’s interest. Against this 
background, the influx of refugees is seen by many 
as an unbearable burden. 
NATO is also facing significant challenges in relation 
to the conflict in Syria, where different member 
states are pursuing different and even conflicting 
strategies. Moreover, the latent dispute over 
transatlantic burden-sharing is serious in times of 
scarce resources.
1
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The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) has not yet 
become a driver of economic cooperation among 
its member states. Trade among them has been in 
steady decline. Western sanctions on Russia and 
Russian counter-sanctions, Russia’s withdrawal 
from free trade with Ukraine and the extension of 
EAEU membership to Armenia and Kyrgyzstan 
have contributed to the erosion of the Euro-Asian 
Customs Union. The Ukraine crisis has triggered 
political concerns among member states over 
Russia’s role and, most fundamentally, has revealed 
the fact that their national interests suffer severely 
from the confrontation between Russia and the 
West. Neither EAEU nor Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) membership is seen by these 
states as a solution for these concerns. Particularly 
in the context of the current crisis, Russia’s allies are 
emphasizing their multi-vector foreign and security 
policies and seeking to expand their relations with 
Euro-Atlantic institutions to balance their relations 
with Russia. 
Russian-Western Relations 
Relations between Russia and the West are at their 
lowest point since the end of the Cold War. Security 
relations soured in the wake of NATO enlargement, 
disputes over arms control, the Kosovo conflict 
and independence, and Western interventions 
in Iraq and Libya. As manifested by the conflict 
over Ukraine’s association with the EU, economic 
integration issues are now part and parcel of the 
highly securitized dispute over the European order.
These developments are reinforced by a widening gap 
in how the actors understand the underlying norms 
and values of the European order, while mounting 
controversy at interstate level is complemented 
by deepening estrangement between societies. 
Russia no longer sees itself as part of the Euro-
Atlantic community of states and, instead, seeks to 
protect itself from the Western policy of promoting 
democracy and human rights, often confused with 
a policy of regime change and interference in the 
internal affairs of sovereign states. 
At the same time, Russia’s involvement in the 
Ukraine crisis has raised concerns in the West, 
especially among Russia’s neighbors, that Moscow 
is pursuing a revisionist policy that seeks to revise 
the post-Cold War European order. This has moved 
Russia’s neighbors, which have recently become 
members of the EU and NATO, to seek credible 
reassurances from the Alliance and to move towards 
a deterrence posture vis-à-vis Russia.
As a result, we are witnessing a further deepening 
and hardening of the fault line between Russia 
and the West and a rapid dismantlement of the 
foundations of cooperative security in Europe, 
which have been in place since the end of the Cold 
War. The British narrative speaks of the end of an 
attempt over a quarter of a century to build bridges 
and of “deep competition and, in effect, covert 
confrontation”. To be sure, current developments 
do not replicate the historical Cold War, which was 
a global and antagonistic ideological confrontation 
pursued by orderly assigned camps. However, they 
are increasingly reminiscent of Cold War behavior, 
in which the “other” was framed in a black and white 
manner as the only one bearing guilt for the conflict, 
and had to be removed before a resolution could be 
found. This kind of essentialist approach is a really 
alarming sign.
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The Impact of External Developments 
 
Two developments have had a salient impact on 
Europe: The change in global economic and power 
structures, and conflicts and instability in Europe’s 
vicinity. 
Rates of growth in Europe – the EU as well as 
wider Europe – are generally low, while a number 
of emerging countries are growing much faster. 
Europe can thus be said to be losing ground, at least 
in comparative terms. A new wave of protectionism 
would further complicate the situation. At the 
same time, Europe depends increasingly on global 
developments and decisions over which it has less 
influence. Europe, as well as its major constituent 
parts, has not yet found a way to deal with this. 
At the same time, climate change and large-scale 
disintegration and violent conflict in neighboring 
regions have had a number of consequences for the 
OSCE region, among them the increasing danger 
of transnational terrorism and violent extremism, 
as well as more refugees. It is undeniable that 
conflicts in these regions are having a direct impact 
on Europe, far more so than in the past. There is 
little hope that these conflicts can be resolved in the 
foreseeable future. Just decreasing their intensity 
would be a success. 
The complexity and interconnectedness of today’s 
conflicts have a number of consequences. Changes 
in one area can have substantial implications for 
completely different areas. Whether the USA and 
Russia cooperate or do not cooperate on Syria has 
an impact on their general relations as well as on 
conflicts in Europe. There is always the possibility 
of sudden, non-linear changes in the quality of 
conflicts, for better or for worse. Thus, governments 
and populations have to learn to exercise 
governance in the face of a hitherto unknown level 
of uncertainty. The prime task is to deal with the 
situation in a cooperative manner. 
14
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Russia and the West –  
Differences and Shared Views
 
In analyzing the relations between Russia and 
the West, we are looking for convergences and 
divergences in perceptions to find possible platforms 
for cooperation. We start from the understanding 
that Russian-Western disputes are only one part 
of the larger problems that plague the OSCE 
space. We believe that patiently overcoming these 
divisions and shaping cooperation between Russia 
and the West serves the interests of all OSCE 
states and that failure to cooperate will make 
appropriate adjustments to the current challenges an 
increasingly hard mission. For achieving sustainable 
and pragmatic cooperation in the OSCE space, 
dialogue is indispensible.
We have started by analyzing the issue of principles 
and norms, followed by interests and assessments, 
and come, finally, to institutions and instruments. 
Each of these three sub-chapters deals with security, 
economic and normative issues.  
 
2.1 Principles and Norms
One of the characteristics of the current turbulent 
period is that the behavior of governments is 
less norm-guided than it was in more stable 
times. Violations of international law and related 
accusations have become common. 
Security. Nobody in the OSCE area openly questions 
the validity of the Helsinki principles governing 
relations among the OSCE participating States. 
However, there are substantially and increasingly 
different interpretations of what specific principles 
imply and what their mutual relationship is. This 
concerns most of the ten principles, particularly 
those of sovereign equality (I), refraining from 
the threat or use of force (II), the inviolability of 
frontiers (III), the territorial integrity of states (IV), 
non-intervention in internal affairs (VI), respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms (VII), and 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples (VIII).
The commitments to democracy based on human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, prosperity 
through economic liberty and social justice, and 
equal security for all nations, expressed in the 1990 
Charter of Paris for a New Europe and reconfirmed 
on many occasions thereafter, among others, in 
the 1999 Charter of European Security and in the 
2010 Astana Commemorative Declaration, are 
increasingly disputed. Russia and some other states, 
including countries in the West, differ from the 
mainstream Western understanding of political 
principles, leaving an increasing normative gap.
According to the prevailing Western narrative, 
the Russian government has seriously broken 
international law in Crimea and through its 
involvement in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, 
calling into question the whole European order. 
In a number of countries, for example, Germany 
and the USA, there is concern that Russia might 
broadly reject the Helsinki consensus of a rule-
based European order. From a Finnish point of view, 
the Helsinki and Paris order is in serious crisis, 
but not yet necessarily broken. For its part, the 
Russian narrative says that Western countries have 
broken and undermined international law with a 
number of military interventions and attempts at 
2
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regime change from Kosovo to Libya. Russia sees 
itself as having pushed for a rule-based European 
order with its European Security Treaty initiative, 
which Western countries were not ready to discuss 
seriously. An additional asymmetry is that Russia 
perceives its conflicts with Western states as a global 
issue, whereas the West sees relations to Russia 
predominantly as a regional question.
From a more specific security policy perspective, the 
2010 Astana vision of “comprehensive, co-operative, 
equal and indivisible security”4 is in jeopardy. While 
cooperative security has remained the official 
concept of the OSCE and no state has yet formally 
renounced it, the practical behavior of most states 
shows that they currently rely more on deterrence 
than on cooperative security. Correspondingly, two 
of the three pillars of the OSCE arms control regime 
are either politically dead (Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe / CFE) or urgently need 
modernization (Vienna Document on Confidence- 
and Security-Building Measures 2011), while the 
Open Skies Treaty is still functioning.
The expectation prominent in the early 1990s that a 
comparatively quick norms transfer to the transition 
countries would lead to more cohesion and, thus, 
to stability, has largely failed. The question remains 
whether this failure is temporary or long-term in 
nature. The answer to this question, which is not yet 
apparent, has fundamental consequences. In the first 
case, a rule-based order remains a long-term option; 
in the second case, it will be very difficult to achieve. 
Historical optimism makes us believe in the first 
option. The long-term objective of a norm-based 
European security order – a security community – 
should be maintained. However, for the time being, 
4 OSCE, Summit, Astana 2010, Astana Commemorative Declaration. 
Towards a Security Community, para. 2.
and this means a period of undefined duration, it 
remains a remote goal. The normative consensus 
between Russia and the Western countries is not 
stable enough to build concrete politics upon. 
Consequently, cooperation has to be based on more 
concrete interests to achieve a critical minimum of 
stability and cooperation. From the perspective of 
some countries, this is not new. In Kazakhstan, the 
prevalent view is that norms are not so decisive. 
Also in the French narrative, the perception that one 
should follow a realpolitik-based approach, focusing 
on interests, plays a prominent role.
Economy. In the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the 
expectation was expressed that economic 
cooperation would foster stability and security: 
“Convinced that their efforts to develop co-
operation in the fields of trade, industry, science 
and technology, the environment and other areas of 
economic activity contribute to the reinforcement of 
peace and security in Europe and in the world as a 
whole.”5 This is echoed by the 2003 “OSCE Strategy 
Document for the Economic and Environmental 
Dimension”, which assesses itself as “an important 
step forward in developing our efforts to intensify 
economic and environmental co-operation 
among the participating States and thus to ensure 
comprehensive security and stability in the OSCE 
region.”6
While statements like these are still fundamentally 
valid, they need differentiation. Weak economic 
interdependence, such as the simple exchange of 
goods, can achieve only little in creating stability 
and security. But this is precisely what we have 
in the relationship between Russia and Western 
5 CSCE, Summit, Helsinki 1975, Helsinki Final Act, chap. Co-
operation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and 
of the Environment, 1st sentence.
6 OSCE, Ministerial Council Meeting, Maastricht 2003, OSCE 
Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental 
Dimension, pt. 4.1.
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countries. Moreover, asymmetric interdependence, 
where one partner is more dependent on the other, 
can even be used to exert political pressure with 
economic sanctions or other trade restrictions. 
Thus, the belief that economic interconnectedness 
will automatically lead to more stability has been 
seriously challenged. 
Values and norms can unite or divide societies as 
well as states. While principles and commitments 
are codified in international documents, the body 
of norms and values on which different societies 
agree is constantly changing. Within the OSCE area, 
we observe quite different social and governance 
structures and value systems. Consequently, there 
are – beyond the level of official documents – quite 
different sets of domestic values and different 
perceptions of right and wrong.
Summary. Contrary to the dominant expectation 
in the 1990s, there is no normative consensus 
among Russia, Western and other countries in the 
OSCE space that would provide a sufficient basis 
for practical politics. That does not mean that 
norms and commitments do not play any role at 
all. Neither does it mean that the problem can be 
reduced to a lack of appropriate implementation. 
It does mean that the normative consensus among 
the participating States is so weak that it no longer 
sufficiently informs policy-relevant decisions. For 
a norm-based organization, such as the OSCE, this 
is a fundamental problem that the 57 participating 
States have not yet really addressed. 
This sober finding has two principal consequences: 
First, at the present stage, cooperation among states 
should be primarily based on shared interests and 
assessments. This will not produce as much stability 
as a norm-based regime. It will also produce less 
human security for individuals and increase the risk 
of human rights being relativized in view of powerful 
interests. Second, societies, states and the OSCE 
itself should start to deal with normative issues in a 
serious manner. At the state level, this concerns the 
principles and norms of the Helsinki, Paris, Istanbul 
and Astana acquis that should not be renegotiated. 
Rather, their interpretation and application under 
the current conditions should be discussed. 
At the societal level, norms dialogues should be 
conducted with the aim of mapping the currently 
existing normative structures, their divergences 
as well as their convergences, and discussing how 
a future common normative basis might look. In 
Recommendation C we make a corresponding 
proposal. 
2.2 Interests and Assessments
European order. The core of the dispute between 
Russia and Western countries is the disagreement 
over the European order. As evidenced by, among 
other things, the Ukraine crisis, there is no longer 
a consensus on the principles, instruments and 
institutional framing of such an order. Historically, 
the Helsinki Final Act represented a compromise 
on the European order relevant for the period up to 
1990. De facto European frontiers, including those 
of Eastern Germany, were politically recognized, 
irrespective of historical territorial claims. Since it 
was clear which bloc controlled which frontiers, the 
spheres of interest were clear-cut and rather well 
respected during the Cold War. 
Currently, we have neither a functioning cooperative 
order nor one that sets rules for competition, since 
one of the security blocs that formed the basic 
structure of the Cold War has disappeared. Some 
argue that this implies that all European states 
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should be free to choose the organizations they 
wish to join. Others believe that indivisible security 
dictates a natural privilege of interest in certain 
spheres. The competition between these two visions 
is the core of the dispute. This competition without 
rules leads to instability and violent conflict. If 
Europe wants to regain lasting stability, states have 
to elaborate a shared understanding of a set of 
rules governing the European order on the basis of 
the Helsinki and Paris principles. Finding a proper 
starting point for such a process would, in itself, 
mark a major step forward.
The dispute over the European order rests on 
the fact that efforts to create a sustainable inter-
linkage between Russia and the West, in the sense 
of a durable, cooperative and resilient connection 
between these two elements, have failed, at least for 
the time being. Discussions about the integration 
of Russia into NATO were not fruitful. What 
was actually attempted was establishing a special 
relationship between Russia and the Western 
integration structures. The NATO-Russia Council 
and the EU Four Common Spaces are the most 
important examples. However, although not 
completely unsuccessful, these efforts have not 
resolved the problem. 
Russia has started to build up its own integration 
structures, namely the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic 
Union (EAEU). These institutions may be quite 
different from their Western counterparts and serve 
different purposes. What matters is that they exist. 
The boundaries of the Russian and Western sets of 
integration structures are not clearly delineated. 
They overlap as far as countries are concerned which 
are not, but eventually may (and, in some cases, 
desire to) become part of either or both of them. 
Consequently, there is competition in one form or 
another for the states that have not yet made their 
choices.7 This produces a dangerous tendency to 
treat such countries as objects of policies pursued 
by European powers, rather than as sovereign states 
that should make their own choices. 
This concern is reflected in the security policy 
narratives of the countries involved. In Belarus, 
for example, Russia-West détente and a 
convergence between EU-based and Russia-led 
integration projects is perceived as an important 
precondition for mitigating the consequences 
of the current confrontation. In Kazakhstan, the 
growing competition between the leading powers 
is increasingly seen as a threat to their national 
interest. The vital importance of maintaining high-
level political contacts, even in difficult times, is also 
emphasized in the security policy discourse of other 
countries, such as Finland. Switzerland, supported 
by a number of states, has initiated the “economic 
connectivity” debate to transform a spheres-of-
influence thinking into a win-win situation.
Politico-military situation. The dispute over the 
European order has been widely securitized and, to a 
certain degree, re-militarized. The war in Ukraine is 
the most visible evidence. Both Russia and the West 
currently prefer deterrence to cooperative security. 
This manifests itself in the increased number and 
size of military exercises, including those conducted 
on short notice and close to borders, as well as risky 
maneuvers by vessels and aircraft, which can lead to 
unintended incidents, with a considerable potential 
for escalation. Therefore, it is long overdue that 
Russia and the NATO states start to discuss these 
issues in the NATO-Russia Council.
7 Cf. Back to Diplomacy, Final Report and Recommendations of the 
Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common 
Project, November 2015.
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Most military measures taken by the various sides 
aim at increasing the readiness of armed forces or 
at relocating them to a limited degree. The overall 
figures of military equipment, however, have 
remained comparatively low and no general build-
up, rearmament, or arms race has yet been observed. 
Neither side has enough military capabilities to start 
“large-scale offensive action” on a continental scale. 
What is possible, however, is geographically limited 
war, such as in Ukraine, as well as unintended war. 
Hybrid warfare, cyber attacks and other attempts 
to undermine societal resilience add to the picture. 
Taken together, for the time being, we are observing 
a limited militarization including some risk of re-
nuclearization. The military situation can become 
more dangerous if it remains unchecked, but it is a 
symptom, not the cause of the dispute.  
Threat perceptions. The fluid situation of a limited 
militarization is reflected in the fact that a number 
of governments harbor stronger threat perceptions 
than their populations do. Thus, significant 
majorities of the populations in such diverse 
countries as Belarus, France, Italy, the Netherlands 
and Switzerland rate military threats as low. 
However, in a more recent poll (February / March 
2016), 48 per cent of Germans perceived Russia as 
a threatening country, whereas only 25 per cent 
of Russians saw Germany as threatening.8 At the 
same time, Russian public opinion polls recorded 
an unprecedented surge of fears of a possible war 
with the US during the culmination of fighting 
in Ukraine at the end of 2014 and early 2015. 
More than the general public in many countries, 
governments and international organizations have 
started to allude to more or less explicit security 
concerns. In the communiqué of the NATO 
8 Körber Stiftung, Russland in Europa, Annäherung oder 
Abschottung. Ergebnisse einer repräsentativen Umfrage von TNS 
Infratest Politikforschung in Deutschland und Russland, Hamburg 
2016, p. 7.
Warsaw Summit of 8-9 July 2016 we read: “Russia’s 
aggressive actions, including provocative military 
activities in the periphery of NATO territory and its 
demonstrated willingness to attain political goals by 
the threat and use of force, are a source of regional 
instability, fundamentally challenge the Alliance, 
have damaged Euro-Atlantic security, and threaten 
our long-standing goal of a Europe whole, free, and 
at peace.”9 And the 2015 National Security Strategy 
of the United Kingdom states about Russia that 
one “cannot rule out the possibility that it [Russia] 
may feel tempted to act aggressively against NATO 
Allies.”10 Conversely, we can read in the “Concept 
of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” of 
February 2013: “Russia maintains a negative attitude 
towards NATO’s expansion and to the approaching 
of NATO military infrastructure to Russia’s borders 
in general as to actions that violate the principle 
of equal security and lead to the emergence of 
new dividing lines in Europe.”11 It is, however, 
striking that states such as Belarus or Kazakhstan 
avoid identifying specific threats, but express their 
concern in more general terms such as an “increase 
in competition between leading powers.”  
The situation is significantly different in countries, 
such as Georgia or Ukraine, where threat 
perceptions about Russia are most prominent, both 
among the public and in governments. In general, 
we observe that there is a gap in threat perceptions 
between those countries that are situated close to 
Russia and those that are further away. Among the 
latter, perceptions also differ significantly between 
9 NATO, Warsaw Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of State 
and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016, para. 5.
10 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence 
and Security Review 2015. A Secure and Prosperous United 
Kingdom, Cm 9161, Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister 
by Command of Her Majesty in November 2015, pt. 3.20.
11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Concept of the Foreign Policy 
of the Russian Federation, Approved by the President of the Russian 
Federation V. Putin on 12 February 2013, para. 63.
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governments and populations. However, the longer 
the divisions between Russia and the West exist, the 
more threat perceptions spread among the broader 
population. 
Economy. The fragmented picture of European 
economies is a direct consequence of the countries’ 
unequal abilities to adapt to globalization and the 
different results of economic transition. Countries 
such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Hungary have become integral parts of the 
international production chain. Accordingly, the 
convergence between these countries and those from 
the old West is deep, although differences in political 
culture and identity remain. 
Apart from that, the economic exchange between 
the EU countries and the countries from the post-
Soviet space has mostly remained at a rather 
simple level: Raw materials, most prominently 
hydrocarbons, are exchanged for machinery, cars 
and other manufactured goods. The comparison of 
these two cases shows the direct impact of economic 
and societal factors on the interstate level: Whereas 
in the first case, we have deep interdependence in the 
sense that the two elements – the old and the new 
EU states – cannot be separated without destroying 
the whole, the second case is characterized by weak 
and asymmetrical interdependence that makes 
it easier to use economic tools, including trade 
barriers and sanctions, as instruments in political 
disputes, provided the political will is present to 
accept the resulting economic costs. 
Competing interests in economic integration 
have been a significant source of conflict in the 
case of Ukraine. And while politics can influence 
economic transition processes only modestly and 
over the long-term, it can directly instrumentalize 
economic vulnerabilities for political purposes. 
Although it is exaggerated to say, as some experts 
do, that economic warfare has replaced military 
warfare, this contains an element of truth. As a 
result, it is possible to start a negative, disintegrative, 
economic-political spiral by political means: The 
exploitation of economic weaknesses by one side can 
be followed by attempts by the other side to reduce 
its own vulnerabilities. This can only be achieved by 
reducing the connectedness between economies and 
societies and leads ultimately to a policy of isolation 
and autarky. 
A responsible European stability policy must 
counteract such tendencies and strengthen 
interconnectedness to the point at which stability 
is achieved by strong interdependence. Economic 
relations must be calculable on a long-term basis. 
Tendencies towards economic warfare must be 
contained by new economic confidence-building 
measures. In Recommendation A, we propose 
the elaboration of such a set of economic and 
environmental CBMs.
Perceptions of shared interests. Against the 
background of the current tensions, it is encouraging 
how many interests shared by Russia and Western 
countries have been identified in the narrative 
reports. Strategic issues, such as the New START 
Treaty, and cooperation on space matters and Iran, 
are mentioned in the U.S. paper; nuclear non-
proliferation in the Dutch and Kazakhstani papers. 
Cooperation on transnational threats – terrorism, 
“Islamic State”, cybercrime and climate change 
– is mentioned in most reports, including those 
on France, Germany, Italy, Kazakhstan and the 
Netherlands. The same is true for cooperation on 
Libya, Syria and the Middle East (France, Germany). 
However, conflicts within the OSCE space – 
Ukraine, Nagornyy Karabakh – are also mentioned 
as objects of cooperation (Germany). Finally, 
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economic cooperation is mentioned in the narrative 
reports on France, Italy, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, 
and the Dutch report explicitly mentions potential 
relations between the EU and the EAEU. Altogether, 
the main focus of perceptions of shared interests 
is on global issues and transnational threats, on 
conflict resolution in Europe and the Middle East, 
and on economic issues.
Summary. While the fault lines between Russia 
and the Western states are undeniably deepening, 
a more careful analysis of the situation shows that 
this process has not yet become irreversible. Even 
under the presently strained relations, there is an 
impressively long list of shared interests that allow 
for and necessitate cooperation. Thus, Europe 
should engage in pragmatic cooperation in as many 
fields as possible. 
 
2.3 Institutions and Instruments 
 
Towards a New Compromise  
on the European Order 
The long-term strategic task is to restore consensus 
on a sustainable and rule-based European order. This 
may take a long time. The relevant dialogue has not 
yet even started, pending a settlement of the Ukraine 
conflict. Therefore, from a mid-term perspective, it 
will be necessary to agree on a modus vivendi that 
would allow for mitigating and politically managing 
existing disputes and conflicts. 
This part starts by outlining some obstacles on 
the way ahead, then sketches alternative scenarios 
for Europe that require different kinds of political 
orders. Subsequently, it attempts to describe 
the problem structure of a new European order, 
followed by a proposal to develop a Code of Conduct 
for Facilitating a Diplomatic Process.
Obstacles on the Way ahead 
First, political leaderships of most states are 
overwhelmed by urgent practical issues from 
Brexit to Syria and Ukraine. This makes it difficult 
to address the more fundamental question of the 
European order. 
Second, zero-sum game calculations and unilateral 
approaches prevail on many sides. There is not yet 
enough readiness to seriously address the relevant 
issue of the European order. However, attempts to 
change the conditions to one’s own advantage and 
only then to negotiate will likely have no success.
Third, any consensus on a sustainable European 
order would require a respective normative basis. 
However, there is no readiness yet to reopen the 
issue of reaching an agreed interpretation of the 
Helsinki and Paris principles in order to achieve a 
shared interpretation adjusted to the new landscape 
without renegotiating them.
Fourth, multiple external factors aggravate the 
difficulties of creating a European order. 
Approaching the starting point for a process towards 
a shared understanding of the principles of the 
European order makes it mandatory to work on each 
of these areas of difficulties. 
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Alternative Futures for  
Russian-Western Relations 
There is a wide spectrum of imaginable alternative 
options for shaping future relations between Russia 
and the West, ranging from containment to minimal 
or selective cooperation, pragmatic transactional 
cooperation, through developing a security 
community.
A strategy of one-sided or mutual containment, 
accompanied by an increasing remilitarization and 
nuclearization of security relations, does not find 
support in any of our 15 narrative reports. It is 
evident that this approach would ruin Europe and 
would represent a danger for the rest of the world.
A somewhat milder version could be called 
a strategy of neglect and minimal or selective 
cooperation. Cooperation would be limited to 
some key economic areas, such as trade with 
hydrocarbons, whereas other areas could be the 
subject of sanctions. This would be accompanied by 
at least a limited remilitarization. This option also 
received no support in the narrative reports.
A third option would be a strategy of pragmatic 
transactional cooperation. This kind of cooperation 
starts from the current realities, whether one likes 
them or not, and looks for as many possibilities for 
cooperation as possible. This approach got support 
in almost all of the narrative reports, reflecting 
the security policy discussions in, among other 
countries, Belarus, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Kazakhstan, the Netherlands and the United States. 
However, the level of confidence in the potential 
of such a strategy varies significantly: While the 
Ukrainian perception expects equal or even growing 
confrontation with Russia and does not see a viable 
option for a win-win situation, the Finnish narrative 
aims at restoring common security based on the 
OSCE principles. The proponents of pragmatic 
transactional cooperation see a comparatively large 
spectrum of possible areas of cooperation, from 
economic issues to addressing transnational threats 
to resolving conflicts in Europe (cf. section 2.2). 
The option of introducing a new Yalta-type order 
by clearly delineating and observing a sphere of 
influence for Russia in Eastern Europe or that of 
returning to a Vienna Congress-type concert of 
European powers governance system, strongly 
favored in the Russian mainstream thinking, does 
not find any significant support in other countries.
Finally, there is the Astana vision of a norm-based 
security community, which was not mentioned as a 
realistic option in any of the narrative reports. 
The more cooperation between Russia and the 
West, the more a new compromise on the principles 
governing the European order is needed. 
 
Problem Structure of a  
New European Order 
We are still far away from having solutions for a new 
consensus on the European order. Our governments 
have not yet started a substantial discussion on the 
issue. However, it is possible to discuss the structure 
of the problem.
The European order should rest on the Helsinki 
principles, but cannot simply copy the bipolar 
Helsinki order. The key element of this historical 
order was the legitimation of existing frontiers, 
which, under the Cold War conditions of opposing, 
stable military blocs, made it possible to legitimize 
the existence of three groups of states – Western, 
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Eastern and neutral and non-aligned (NN) states. 
Thus, the status of each state was defined and the 
different spheres of interest were largely respected.
Today’s situation is much more fluid in every 
respect. The status of a number of states is 
not clearly defined.  They may be interested in 
cooperation with this or that side or with both. 
According to Helsinki Principle I, they have the 
right to choose which to join. Various integration 
organizations compete over them using various 
means. In this situation, the key issue is the relation 
between different emerging integration structures. 
In addition, external states, such as China, influence 
the OSCE space. The historical bipolar reflex tells us: 
either we or they. A modern approach would think 
in terms of overlapping memberships and rules 
governing cooperation and competition. 
Principle I of the Helsinki Decalogue stresses 
“sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent 
in sovereignty” and includes the following text: 
“They [the participating States] also have the 
right to belong or not to belong to international 
organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral 
or multilateral treaties including the right to be or 
not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also 
have the right to neutrality.”
Apart from the recognition of the neutral and 
non-aligned states, this principle did not play a 
major role for the Helsinki order until this order 
was transformed by the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and the Warsaw Pact and the reunification 
of Germany. But Principle I could play a major role 
for a future European order. The formula “to be or 
not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties” 
means free choice. At the same time, the OSCE 
participating States have committed themselves to 
“bearing in mind the legitimate security concerns of 
other States”12 while implementing this freedom of 
choice. This is only possible if there is no pressure to 
decide to join this or that side and if the necessary 
framework is in place. This requires contact and 
dialogue between all integration structures and, 
particularly, between the EU and the EAEU and 
the NATO and the CSTO / Russia, joint rules of 
behavior, and the elaboration of a framework that 
allows individual states to participate in the treaties 
in which they want to participate without losing 
their cooperation with others.
Whereas the Helsinki order was adapted to a bipolar 
world, the prime challenge for a new European 
order is to govern integration issues in an inclusive 
and flexible manner that avoids falling back on the 
inherited patterns of bipolarity.
 
Code of Conduct for Facilitating  
a Diplomatic Process 
The Panel of Eminent Persons’ 2015 Report “Back 
to Diplomacy” called for a “robust process of active 
diplomacy” with the “ultimate aim […] to re-
establish security on a co-operative basis”13. There is 
no alternative to such a political process apart from 
ongoing crises, escalation and war. However, starting 
a process towards a cooperative order requires 
at least an agreed starting point and an overall 
objective, both in terms of the dos and the do-nots, 
and there must be a mental mindset guiding the 
process. Elements of such a starting point can be 
formulated in a kind of Code of Conduct that does 
not necessarily have to be a written document, 
but can also be expressed in the form of a series of 
statements.
12 OSCE, Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, 3 
December 1994, DOC.FSC/1/95, para. IV.10.
13 Back to Diplomacy, quoted above (note 7), pp. 5 and 14.
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Such a Code of Conduct would aim at lowering the 
level of confrontation, strengthening communication 
among the sides, and setting up guidelines for 
cooperation. 
Measures to lower the level of confrontation could 
include:
•	 The	sides	–	governments	and	different	societal	
actors alike – should deliberately avoid any steps 
that might raise the level of confrontation. In 
principle, this means reacting sub-proportionally 
to any step by the other side that is perceived as 
unfriendly. 
•	 The	sides	should	agree	on	deliberate	de-
escalatory steps. Such steps can also be taken 
by relevant societal actors, such as religious 
denominations or economic enterprises.
Measures to strengthen communication could 
include:
•	 The	sides	should	de-escalate	their	rhetoric,	
discourage hate speech and stop attempts to 
frame the other side as an enemy with whom 
no solution can be found. It should be clear 
that the partner at state level is the current 
government in office and not any future 
government that might be seen as better. 
•	 The	sides	should	maintain	as	many	channels	
of communication as possible at all levels. 
Sustainable cooperation will need related 
public diplomacy efforts. 
•	 The	sides	should	conduct	a	dual	dialogue	
both on issues where agreement can be 
achieved and on issues where agreement 
cannot be expected soon. The first line 
of dialogue serves to frame platforms for 
cooperation, whereas the second serves to 
avoid misperceptions arising from disputed 
issues. 
•	 Governments	could	turn	to	academic	
or other societal bodies to deal with 
contradictory narratives and adjust visa 
regimes to facilitate such contacts. 
Measures to re-establish cooperation could include:
•	 The	sides	should	cooperate	wherever	
possible, on any given subject, at any level, 
be it state or society. Unnecessary conditions 
for cooperation should be avoided.
•	 The	sides	should	cooperate	on	climate	
change, terrorism and other global or 
transnational issues. In doing so, they should 
include science and education, as well as 
other societal fields, to the maximum extent 
possible.
•	 The	sides	should	consult	on	their	
cooperation with third partners in 
neighboring regions as well as on a global 
level. 
•	 Political	leaders	should	communicate	to	their	
populations their willingness to cooperate.
A Code of Conduct of this kind shapes the 
mindsets in the direction of cooperation, based on 
compromises. 
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Creating a More Connected  
Economic Order 
Currently, we are observing two major 
characteristics in economic governance beyond 
the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
First, despite the existence of two different economic 
integration vehicles, the EU and the EAEU, there are 
no formal political ties between these organizations. 
Second, the re-emergence of economic sanctions 
in the Russian-Western relationship underlines 
the need for mechanisms guiding states’ economic 
behavior in case of interstate conflicts.
Relations between the EU and the EAEU. These two 
organizations are very different in every respect 
– their objectives, the instruments available and 
performance. This is frequently used as an argument 
against dialogue and relations between these two 
bodies. However, the Ukraine crisis has shown that 
this line of argument is counterproductive. Among 
other factors, it was the lack of communication 
that contributed to creating the conditions for the 
conflict. Thus, the EU and the EAEU, as well as their 
member states, should enter into a dialogue with 
the objective of exploring the kinds of relations that 
are possible. Such an approach is supported by a 
wide range of states, including Belarus, Germany, 
Italy, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, and Russia. 
The dialogue should include wider issues related to 
economic affairs, such as the freedom of movement. 
It should also include relations to third states, such 
as China. Discussions could be kick-started in 
the OSCE framework, i.e. in the OSCE Economic 
and Environmental Forum and in the Permanent 
Council’s Economic and Environmental Committee.
Economic confidence-building measures (CBMs).  
Both in the Ukraine conflict and in the 2016 dispute 
between Russia and Turkey, economic sanctions and 
counter-sanctions have played a prominent role. 
Thereby, this instrument is back on the table on a 
scale not seen in Russian-Western relations in three 
decades. The necessary condition for sanctions is 
a certain economic connectedness, the sufficient 
one is weak interdependence, meaning that the 
connectedness does not go far enough and/or is of 
an asymmetrical nature. At least in part, economic 
sanctions have been used as a replacement for 
military measures. To stimulate the discussion, this 
report proposes the elaboration of an initial package 
of OSCE economic and environmental CBMs (cf. 
Recommendation A). 
Working on Re-Establishing  
a Shared Normative Order 
Any notion of a security community, but also of a 
cooperative European security order, requires the 
existence of a shared normative basis. Currently, no 
sufficiently firm joint value base on which to build 
practical policies exists. Norms are not only not 
shared, but different and diverging norms are used 
as political weapons in an attempt to violate and 
humiliate the political ‘enemy’. Thus, when we speak 
about the option of re-establishing a cooperative 
European order, we implicitly presuppose not only 
the termination of such norms manipulation, but 
also and, much more profoundly, the reversal of the 
trend of a divergent normative development in favor 
of a convergent one. 
Restoring the OSCE states’ damaged value base is a 
long-term project with uncertain success. Despite 
and just because of this fact, a number of steps 
should be started.
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First, States should stop misusing norms disputes as 
political weapons. 
Second, civil society actors should initiate norms 
dialogues at the societal level. In Recommendations 
B and C we make proposals for such dialogues.
Third, it is urgent that the OSCE, as a norms-based 
organization, start to deal with the fact that its 
presupposed shared normative basis has broadly 
disappeared. 
Working on norms is difficult and will not produce 
results soon. However, it is an indispensable task 
in view of the objective of a new consensus on a 
cooperative order in Europe.
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Recommendations
 
We offer two sets of recommendations. First, 
addressing the governments of the OSCE 
participating States with a Program of Urgent Action 
(3.1), which summarizes the most important steps 
that should be addressed immediately. The second 
set concerns recommendations to be implemented 
at the societal level by the OSCE Network of Think 
Tanks and Academic Institutions.  
 
3.1 Program of Urgent Action
In view of unpostponable global and regional 
challenges, the states in the Euro-Atlantic and 
Eurasian area should agree on a Programme of 
Urgent Action that serves the following goals:
•	 Sending	a	clear	signal	that	the	states	are	ready	
to resume dialogue and look for options for 
cooperation.
•	 Structuring	the	different	lines	of	dialogue	
and thus defining a starting point for broader 
intergovernmental communication.
•	 Agreeing	on	some	urgent	measures	without	
political conditions and linkages.
It is clear that the key issues will have to be dealt 
with between the EU and Russia, NATO and Russia, 
and at bilateral levels. Both the Council of Europe 
and the UN Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE) can also play a constructive role. The 
OSCE can make significant and, in some areas, 
crucial contributions. It is not important in what 
form a Programme of Urgent Action is agreed, 
formally or informally. What is important is that 
there be a clear shared understanding among the key 
actors. Such a programme could have the following 
elements.
A. Measures to Normalize the Situation
States should send some clear public political 
messages that they do want to resume political 
dialogue and explore options for cooperation. Such 
messages can take different forms:
•	 Concerted	public	statements	of	political	leaders	
represent the easiest option.
•	 A	Code	of	Conduct	for	Facilitating	a	Diplomatic	
Process (cf. section 2.3), whether informally 
agreed or formalized, would represent a more 
elaborate variant.
Whereas questions of form can be flexibly handled, 
it is key that states consistently send the same 
message – returning to political dialogue and 
cooperation.
3
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B. Structuring the Dialogue
The argument of ‘no business as usual with Russia’ 
has become ineffective. On the one hand, global and 
regional challenges do not wait until states agree on 
something. On the other hand, dialogue is key for 
resolving conflicts including the one in and around 
Ukraine. 
The necessary dialogue will be conducted along 
different lines: Some elements have to be discussed 
between the EU and Russia, others in the NATO-
Russia Council, still others in the OSCE, and 
some other issues are on the agenda of ad-hoc 
arrangements, such as the Normandy Format. The 
key stakeholders should come to an informal or 
formal agreement on an inclusive and structured 
dialogue that is transparent about what is discussed 
where and with whom. This dialogue structure is 
the starting point of broader intergovernmental 
communication on the options for a pragmatic 
transactional cooperation. 
C. Politico-Military Issues  
States should quickly agree on some immediate 
steps and, at the same time, create the space for 
further exchange.
•	 States	should	conclude,	in	a	timely	manner	
and in the framework of the NATO-Russia 
Council (NRC) – an agreement to avoid military 
incidents and accidents including measures to be 
taken if they should occur.
•	 States	should	initiate,	also	in	the	NRC,	a	
high-level political as well as military-to-
military dialogue on further options for risk 
reduction and stabilization through measures 
of confidence- and security-building and arms 
control. 
These measures should be accompanied by 
discussions among the 57 states in the OSCE 
Forum for Security Co-operation, including on the 
modernization of the related OSCE instruments 
(Vienna Document 2011).
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D. Conflict Resolution
The relevant states should agree on substantial 
progress in the implementation of the Minsk 
Agreement and on further strengthening the OSCE’s 
crisis prevention and conflict management tools.14
•	 It	is	evident	that	substantial	progress	in	the	
implementation of the Minsk Agreement, of its 
security as well as of its political parts, would 
significantly facilitate a positive development 
in other areas, while failure would leave larger 
questions open. Therefore, progress in resolving 
the Ukraine crisis is key. 
•	 The	deployment	of	the	Special	Monitoring	
Mission (SMM) to Ukraine has shown that 
the OSCE can operate a mission of this size. 
However, it has also become clear that the SMM 
brought the OSCE to the limits of its capacities. 
Therefore, there is a need to further strengthen 
the operational capacities of the OSCE, 
including by innovative means. The OSCE 
Permanent Council should establish an Informal 
Working Group to elaborate proposals. 
14 Another working group of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and 
Academic Institutions, chaired by Ambassador Philip Remler, has 
recently published the Study “Protracted Conflicts in the OSCE 
Area. Innovative Approaches for Co-operation in the Conflict 
Zones”.
E. Economic and Environmental Matters
The overall objective in this area is to create a more 
connected economic order in the Euro-Atlantic and 
Eurasian space. While key tasks need to be carried 
out by the EU, the EAEU and Russia, the OSCE can 
also contribute.
•	 The	EU	and	the	EAEU	should	upgrade	their	
technical talks to the political level and explore 
what kind of relations, contacts and joint 
activities are possible. Related discussions can 
be kick-started and accompanied by debates in 
OSCE bodies.
•	 The	OSCE	should	elaborate	a	set	of	economic	
and environmental confidence-building 
measures (cf. 3.2, Recommendation A).
•	 The	OSCE	should	modernize	its	2003	“OSCE	
Strategy Document for the Economic and 
Environmental Dimension” adapting it to the 
current needs.
30
F. Conducting a Norms Dialogue
Even if cooperation is primarily based on interests, 
norms continue to matter. Therefore, states and 
societies in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area 
should make efforts to re-establish their severely 
damaged norms base. This should include a number 
of normative dimensions:
•	 States	should	work	on	re-establishing	a	shared	
understanding of the principles of the Helsinki 
Decalogue including their mutual relationship.
•	 States	should	also	work	on	restating	a	common	
understanding of the basic norms of human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law contained 
in the Paris Charter and follow-on documents.
•	 States	should	also	make	efforts	towards	a	
joint understanding of the norms guiding 
“comprehensive, co-operative, equal and 
indivisible security” (Astana Commemorative 
Declaration).
Finally, states should work on any other relevant 
normative issues. Norm dialogues must include 
civil society actors in a multitude of formats. Norm 
dialogues have a long-term perspective. But they are 
essential for laying the ground for re-establishing a 
shared understanding on the European order.
G. Conducting an Inclusive  
Trans-Societal Dialogue
As the populist movements in many regions of 
the OSCE area have shown, political mobilization 
and divisions have long since reached the societal 
level. In the same way, addressing these challenges 
in a cooperative manner will only be successfully 
achieved by a comprehensive approach including 
all relevant strata of society. As a consequence, all 
relevant lines of discussion must also be conducted 
at societal levels. Track 2 and 1.5 formats can 
parallel intergovernmental talks. Sometimes, 
they can address issues that are still too sensitive 
for intergovernmental treatment. And trans-
societal debates can put aspects on the agenda that 
have been neglected by governments. Together, 
discussions at societal levels represent not only a 
supplement to intergovernmental talks, but also a 
value in themselves.
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3.2 Proposals for Concrete 
Action by the Network
The following recommendations concern activities 
of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic 
Institutions that, first, serve and support the political 
process towards a shared understanding on the 
basics of a future European order and, second, focus 
on the societal level. 
A. Elaborating a Set of Economic and 
Environmental Confidence-Building 
Measures
We recommend elaborating a set of economic and 
environmental confidence-building measures for the 
OSCE space.
Historical lessons learned as well as more recent 
studies provide evidence that, although economic 
connectedness and interdependence raise the cost 
of confrontation and violent conflict, they do not 
automatically prevent a conflict, particularly when 
political or security stakes are perceived by parties as 
outweighing economic costs of confrontation.
Most recent experiences, gathered in the context 
of the Ukraine crisis, have confirmed that in the 
course of a confrontation, economic interests and 
interdependence do not prevent the countries 
concerned from applying sanctions and counter-
sanctions of various sorts, including economic ones.
Discussing economic confidence-building 
measures leads to the conclusion that sanctions 
do not contribute to building confidence but, 
rather, highlight the vulnerability that results from 
interdependence and thus militate for autarky. We 
believe it is unrealistic to suggest banning sanctions 
as a policy instrument. However, a set of measures 
can help not only to (re-)build trust and confidence 
among states and businesses, but may also be 
instrumental in arresting, at an early stage, conflict-
prone developments that can, at some point, lead to 
the application of sanctions.
In its diverse dimensions, the OSCE offers various 
tools, better known as “mechanisms”, allowing the 
participating States to raise specific concerns and 
committing the relevant states to responding to 
them, with a view toward identifying the eventual 
problems that may result from taking certain 
decisions, and searching for cooperative solutions 
before the problems escalate. However, no such 
preventative mechanism exists in the economic and 
environmental dimension of the OSCE.
We recommend setting up a Network working group 
which would be tasked to:
•	 Explore	the	merits	of	setting	up	a	mechanism	
for bilateral and/or multilateral consultation on 
economic and environmental issues that raise 
concern of individual participating States and 
may affect their interests.
•	 Consult	relevant	stakeholders	on	the	issue.
•	 Assess	the	feasibility	of	establishing	such	a	
mechanism within the OSCE.
•	 Study	measures	that	may	be	required	to	
avoid the abuse of such a mechanism or its 
interference with other existing cooperative 
mechanisms, for example between the EU and 
individual countries or within the WTO.
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•	 Elaborate	a	food-for-thought	paper	for	
consideration by the participating States that can 
be presented at a side event at the 2017 OSCE 
Ministerial Council meeting in Austria.
B. Analyzing Historical Narratives
We recommend analyzing historical narratives 
and elaborating recommendations on how to deal 
with historical narratives in a non-confrontational 
manner.
Narratives are sets of perceptions and beliefs that 
shape collective actors’ expectations and, thus, 
frame their decision-making corridors. Historical 
narratives are sets of perceptions and beliefs 
coming from the past, related to the past and 
transmitted up to today that contribute to shaping 
actors’ expectations. (Historical) narratives are 
not necessarily “objective”, “rational” or free of 
contradictions – quite the contrary. Their relevance 
is that they exist and impact actors’ expectations. 
The Study Group could establish a working group of 
historians with the following tasks:
•	 Identify	historical	narratives	on	Russian-Western	
relations that are still relevant for the present 
stage and analyze their development.
•	 Compare	different	sets	of	historical	narratives	
shared by certain groups in the OSCE area and 
elaborate key differences and agreements.
•	 Elaborate	recommendations	for	governments,	
international organizations and foundations on 
how to deal with historical narratives in a way 
that does not undermine cooperation in Europe.
•	 Elaborate	recommendations	on	how	to	further	
organize a meaningful discussion process on 
(historical) narratives.
The working group should recruit itself and 
cooperate with the Council of Europe, in particular 
with respect to the project on “Educating for 
diversity and democracy: teaching history in 
contemporary Europe” and initiatives such as 
“Historians without Borders” or the Polish-Russian 
Working Group on Most Difficult Issues.
A report could be presented at a side event at the 
2017 OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in Austria.
C. Conducting a Norms Dialogue  
at the Societal Level. 
We recommend creating a dialogue format for 
reflection on a common normative basis, starting 
with the mapping of the status quo. Participants 
should be representatives of the generation that will 
shape interstate and inter-societal relations in about 
ten years. 
The conflict between Russia and the West is not 
only occurring on an intergovernmental level. 
Rather, we are back to levels of suspiciousness and 
estrangement between societies we thought were 
long gone. In this sense, the current conflict is both 
an inter-societal and an intra-societal conflict. The 
various narratives collected are ample proof of this 
assessment, which is confirmed by polls on a regular 
basis.
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Thus, overcoming the current crisis takes more 
than intergovernmental measures and expert 
discussions. We strongly believe that it is necessary 
to continue and to intensify people-to-people 
contacts at all levels. Before reaching a consensus 
on a shared normative order, more knowledge about 
different views and beliefs is required, as is a better 
understanding of the factors and events that have 
created these views and beliefs. 
Therefore, we suggest working on the question of 
what chances exist for a common normative basis 
for a future European order beyond cooperation 
based on common interests and transactional 
advantages.
This dialogue format should bring together 
younger experts, officials and interested citizens. 
The participants will have a double role: Working 
towards a better understanding among each 
other and, thus, among the various societies in 
the OSCE area, but also contributing to shaping 
opinions within their own societies and professional 
communities. By making use of the opportunities 
offered by social media, individuals’ impact on 
opinion formation has grown tremendously. This 
opens up a path for new approaches.
To that end, an OSCE-wide dialogue format could 
be created aiming at:
•	 Mapping	currently	existing	norms	bases	within	
societies of the OSCE area.
•	 Discussing	what	a	future	common	normative	
basis may look like.
•	 Serving	as	dialogue	“ambassadors”	within	their	
own societies.
A report could be presented at a side event at the 
2017 OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in Austria.
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Disclaimer 
In the preparation of this report, valuable advice 
and various contributions were given to us by 
a Reflection Group of members of the OSCE 
Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions. 
Nonetheless, the views set out in this report are 
solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the institutions they represent.
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